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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
David Alexander Kropp appeals from

He

persistent Violator enhancement.

after

he absconded with his alleged

Statement

Of The

Facts

his convictions

0n three counts of burglary, With a

argues that the district court erred by continuing With

alibi witness.

And Course Of The

Proceedings

David Alexander Kropp was charged With three counts of burglary
theft

of items from three storage

trial

units,

in association With the

with an enhancement as a persistent Violator.

(R., pp. 54-

56, 125-27.)

Less than a month before
witness

named Ashely Homer would

the time he

was

arrested.”

his “cousin-in-law,”

Homer,

testify that

(R., pp. 91-92.)

would

February 23, 2017 before noon
until she

Kropp ﬁled a notice of an

trial,

When

alibi

Kropp was With her “the

In an

testify that

amended

notice,

witness stating that a

entire

weekend up

Kropp claimed

that

t0

Ms.

was “With Mr. Kropp from Thursday,

she

she picked up Mr. Kropp from the Flying J in Post Falls,

dropped Mr. Kropp off in Liberty Lake around midnight on Saturday/Sunday February

25/26, 2017.”

(R., pp. 103-05.)

The notice included a caution

Homer recalled

over a year ago,” but suggested that Ms.

that the “said dates/times

the events because they occurred near in

time t0 a “fourth anniversary memorial service for her grandmother’s passing.” (R.,
Trial

was held on March

8th

and

Rutter testiﬁed.

(TL, p. 163. L. 19

relationship with

Kropp beginning

—

9th

p.

0f 2018.

(R., p. 13.)

215, L. 22.)

in January

of 2017.

were

On

the ﬁrst day, Teresa

Ann

was

in a

Ms. Rutter testiﬁed

that she

(Tr., p. 164, Ls. 2-17.)

0f February 23, 2017, Ms. Rutter was with Kropp when he

left

p. 104.)

In the afternoon

the house they were in and

returned With a Subaru

SUV

she had not previously seen. (TL, p. 175, L. 19

identiﬁed Kropp as the individual in two

still

being stolen from a school parking

Washington

(TL, p. 206, L. 14

—

p.

208, L. 14; p. 314, L.

EX.

surveillance Videos);

lot in

— p.

176, L. 5.) She

frames from surveillance Video showing the Subaru

—

1

around 2:00 p.m. on the 23rd 0f February.

at

320, L. 7; EXS., pp. 43, 47

p.

(still

frames from

18 (surveillance Videos in the record in ﬁles titled “20170223-

135248.avi” and “20170223-135637.aVi”).) The owner of the vehicle testiﬁed that he 10st one of
his keys to the

Subaru a week

missing on the afternoon of the

Ms. Rutter testiﬁed

that

23rd.

(TL, p. 258, L. 13

Kropp drove her and

Coeur d’Alene on the

t0 the storage facility in

February 23rd and discovered the Subaru

to ten days prior t0

used bolt cutters t0 break into unit 144, and

late

— p. 263,

another,

L. 3.)

unnamed

having been taken from the

stole tools

(TL, p. 183, L. 2

unit.

testiﬁed that she and Kropp, with

the 25th, broke into

two more

Kropp driving

units, stole

two

Subaru

evening or early morning 0f February

from

— p.

(Tr., p. 176, L.

that unit.

Both she and the renter 0f the unit identiﬁed items

181, L. 11.)

individual, in the

later

16

24th,

—

found in the Subaru as

184, L. 4; p. 240, L. 6

— p.

241, L.

1.)

She

the Subaru, returned in the middle of the day

dirt bikes,

p.

on

a quad, various items 0f clothing, and

assorted items like vases, collectable coins, and a harmonica, and then stole a trailer stored in an

outdoor unit, attached
194, L. 15.)

it

t0 the Subaru,

She again identiﬁed various items

—

p.

was

it

t0 transport the items.

later

p. 194, L. 15), as

223, L. 18; p. 226, L. 10

—

p.

(TL, p. 253, L. 3

later returned to

him

—

trailer

p.

(TL, p. 184, L. 9

recovered from the Subaru as having

—

p. 184, L.

outdoor unit testiﬁed that his
recovered

it

9

from the storage units (TL,
217, L. 2

and used

235, L. 10).

went missing

p.

come

did the renters 0f the units (TL, p.

The owner 0f the

in late February

trailer stored in the

of 2017 and he never

255, L. 12), and the owner of the Subaru testiﬁed that

the trailer hitch cover

—

when

it

on the Subaru had been removed and the towing

Wiring was undone, suggesting that someone had used the Subaru t0 tow something (TL,
L. 25

—

facility in the

Subaru one ﬁnal time, in the

or early morning 0f February 26th, t0 do a favor for a friend and

—

her storage unit. (TL, p. 164, L. 18

Ms.

269,

270, L. 17; p. 272, Ls. 12-21). Ms. Rutter testiﬁed that Kropp drove her and a friend

p.

0f Kropp’s t0 the storage

them.

p.

(Tr., p. 167, L.

p. 168, L. 14.)

The

As

evening 0f February 25th

remove some 0f the items from

they were leaving a blue truck followed

driver of the truck later testiﬁed that he believed

Kropp, and Kropp’s friend were burglarizing the storage

Rutter,

sometimes

20 —

p. 168, L. 5.)

late

facility;

high speeds; called the police; and eventually stopped following and

at

Subaru appeared

t0

lights approaching.

followed,

left after

the

be stuck in the snow in a residential neighborhood and he observed police
(TL, p. 242, L. 12

them, and they were arrested. (TL,

—

p.

249, L. 20.) A11 three

p. 170, L. 11

— p.

173, L. 5.)

ﬂed

the Subaru, police located

Both Ms. Rutter and the owner

0f one 0f the storage units identiﬁed items 0f clothing that the three were wearing when arrested
as having

come from one 0f the

201, L.

—

1

p.

storage units burglarized.

203, L. 6; p. 220, L. 18

—

p.

221, L. 14.)

(TL, p. 196, L. 19

—

p. 198, L. 4; p.

According to Ms. Rutter, the coat

that

Kropp’s friend was wearing—Which had been taken from one of the storage units by she and

Kropp—was

given t0 the friend by Kropp for helping them that evening. (TL,

p. 196, L.

19

—

p.

198, L. 4.)

When

trial

was

set to

resume 0n the second day

at

9:00 a.m., Kropp was not present and

defense counsel represented that he had received a text message from Kropp at 8:52

am. With

“photographs of his car stuck in the snow” and claiming that he had swerved to avoid a deer and

was waiting

for a

tow

truck.

and the court determined
additional information

(Tr., p.

276, L. 4

— p. 277,

L. 13.)

Counsel requested a continuance

t0 give defense counsel twenty—minutes, 0r until 9:30 a.m., t0 gather

from Kropp. (TL,

p.

277, L. 14

— p.

278, L. 23.)

On reconvening,

defense

counsel stated that Kropp reported being “somewhere between Chatcolet and

was described

probably three.”
that

and

as the Conklin Flats”

(Tr., p.

278, L. 25

— p.

that the

tow truck

his Witnesses

The

(Id.)

and so

state

when

trial

was

still

argued that the

trial

should continue in Kropp’s absence because he had

the

trial in

(Tr., p.

280, L. 17

—

282, L. 18.)

p.

Kropp’s explanation for his absence was suspicious and disingenuous

begin

asked the court to do the
ruled that

to confront

am.

a long distance from Coeur d’Alene, had contacted his attorney at 8:52

set to

t0

forth.” (Id.)

at

9:00

here,” claimed that the court has

state,

two hours,

Defense counsel stated that Kropp was not waiving “his right

t0 the state,

where Kropp,

What

Who was subpoenaed

alibi Witness,

voluntarily absented himself under I.C.R. 43(c)(1)(A).

According

driver “said at least

in

280, L. 15.) Defense counsel speculated that the vehicle

was stuck was Ashely Homer’s, Kropp’s alleged

testify that day.

Plummer

latter.

Kropp had

am.

(Id.)

Defense counsel reiterated that Kropp “wants

two options, “proceed Without him or declare a
(TL, p. 282, L. 20

—

p.

his absence under I.C.R. 43(c)(1)(A).

(T12, p.

counsel reiterated that Kropp wanted t0 be present for

who’s under subpoena,

is

make

also unable t0

be able t0 present his defense.” (TL,

p.

it,”

291, L. 23

motion for a continuance or a mistrial

trial,

p.

—

p.

(TL, p. 293, Ls. 6-9.)

and
the

Defense

that his “Witness,

certain rights for

292, L. 2.)

be

t0 continue

291, L. 20.)

and suggested

which “creates

—

and determined

284, L. 17

trial,

mistrial,”

The court agreed With

283, L. 18.)

voluntarily absented himself from

to

my

client to

The court again denied any
The court summarized

its

conclusion that Kropp’s absence was voluntary, expressing skepticism about whether Kropp was

making an

effort t0 appear. (Tr., p. 297, L. 13

— p. 298,

L. 15.)

The second day of trial primarily involved testimony from a
the school resource ofﬁcer through

whom

variety 0f ofﬁcers, including

the state introduced the surveillance Video of

Kropp

around 2:00

pm. 0n the

23rd

and those who arrested Kropp and Ms. Rutter

in the early

morning 0f the

Subaru in Washington

stealing the

9),

at

Subaru, and found various items taken from the storage

locks

still

in

it

(E, gg,

Tr., p.

(Tr. p. 312, L.

26th,

facility, the bolt cutter,

326, Ls. 11-19; p. 334, L. 19

—

p.

16

— p.

320, L.

recovered the

and several cut

335, L. 17; p. 369, L. 14

—

p.

372, L. 11; p. 373, L. 3 —p. 387, L. 21).

At

Kropp

1:15 p.m., roughly four and a half hours after

counsel, defense counsel reported receiving

two more

texts

ﬁrst sent a text to defense

from Kropp, one
9

stated that they

were “‘Eight miles from Coeur d’Alene” and another

“‘Almost there.’”

additional

did.

(Tr., p.

365, L. 23

—

ﬁve minutes before resuming

(Tr., p.

366, L. 19

—

p.

367, L.

p.

When

8.)

Kropp

at 1:12 p.m., stating

Defense counsel suggested waiting an

366, L. 9.)

t0 give

which

at 1:05 p.m.,

additional time to appear,

the court reconvened at 1:27 p.m.,

Which the court

Kropp had

still

not appeared. (TL, p. 367, Ls. 10-12; R., pp. 166-67.) Defense counsel renewed his motion for a

mistrial,

to

which the

district court denied,

be voluntary.” (TL,

that

p.

ﬁnding again

The prosecutor then noted

367, Ls. 17-21.)

Washington had issued a warrant

for

that “defendant’s failure t0 appear appears

Kropp’s

arrest

on an

that she

had been informed

extraditable offense

and the

state

suspected that he was “making himself further unavailable due t0 the knowledge 0f the
extraditable warrant.” (Tr., p. 367, L.

24 —

p.

368, L.

8.)

After the state rested, at about 2:30 p.m., With Kropp and Ms.

defense called no Witnesses. (R., p. 168; Tr., p. 397, L. 9

had reached a verdict

at

p.

399, L. 12.)

around 4:40 p.m., with Kropp and Ms.

169; Tr., p. 433, Ls. 17-22.)

district court denied.

—

Homer

Homer

still

Defense counsel renewed his motion for a

(TL, p. 434, Ls. 2-11.)

The jury returned

still

not present, the

The jury indicated
not present.

mistrial,

guilty verdicts

it

(R., p.

which the

on

all

three

burglary counts. (R., p. 203; Tr., p. 435, Ls. 1-7.) After the parties presented evidence regarding

the persistent Violator enhancement, at about 5:30 p.m., with

present, the jury found that

— p. 448,
there

L. 17.)

At

Kropp was a

that’s

pp. 242-43.)

bench warrant, ﬁnding

He

in

March 0f 2019, defense counsel ﬁled

represented that

457, L. 19

—

p.

458, L.

a motion to quash the warrant.

Kropp had been picked up 0n new charges

3.)

much

time running from

.

.

.

court t0 issue a warrant that had

still

not been served a year

Where Kropp “misled the Court” and “skipped out 0n
In June 0f 2019, defense counsel ﬁled a

(R., p. 250.)

Kropp was not

entitled to a

The

state

pp. 276-77.)

that, at

it

trial

t0

do so

(R., pp. 247-48.)

trial.

8:59 a.m. 0n the morning of the

was

opposed the motion, arguing

“the

459, Ls. 12-15.) The

stuck. (R., pp.

250-5 1 .)

would be two hours before a tow truck

new trial because he was

may order a new trial When

requiring the

would not be appropriate

motion for a new

Ms. Homer,

a reply, defense counsel clariﬁed that the motion

that a court

it

(Tr., p.

a police report that her vehicle

report reﬂected that, according t0

could get t0 her.

later.

trial,”

his trial.” (Tr., p. 461, Ls. 10-17.)

Attached to the motion was a police report indicating

Homer made

Washington and

Defense counsel stated that he would not “embarrass the

court denied the motion t0 quash the warrant, ﬁnding that

second day of trial, Ms.

in

(R.,

the judicial system.”

Court” by “hiding from the fact that [Kropp] did leave in the middle 0f his

that

that

been presented excusing Mr. Kropp from appearing today.”

“has accepted the fact that he has spent far too

The

not

451, L. 18 —p. 453, L. 14.)

A year later,

(Tr., p.

still

204; Tr., p. 447, L. 17

(R., pp. 170,

persistent Violator.

the state’s request, the court then issued a no-bail

was “n0 lawful reason

(Tr., p.

Kropp and Ms. Homer

that

it

was untimely and

voluntarily absent. (R., pp. 253-60.) In

was under Idaho Code

§

19-24060), providing

has been had in [the defendant’s] absence.” (R.,

At

the hearing

0n

based on Ms. Homer’s

his

motion for a new

(TL, p. 478, L. 25

trial.

after initially suggesting that his

appear t0 testify

failure t0

clariﬁed that the basis for the motion

absence from

trial,

—

p.

472, Ls. 10-23), defense counsel

(Tr., p.

was Idaho Code
479, L. 12).

§

motion was

19-2406(1), addressed t0 his

The

state

argued that the motion was

untimely and without merit, as Kropp absconded and had been voluntarily absent. (TL,
L. 25

—

p.

that

it

472,

took him about an hour t0 get t0 their location after they called, and

took him just a few minutes t0 get the car back 0n the road. (TL,

that

it

6.)

According

t0 the prosecutor, given

report, they should

even

appeared,

p.

478, L. 15.) The prosecutor represented that the tow-truck driver recalled assisting Ms.

Homer and Kropp,

Instead,

own

have been

to court

after telling his counsel

ﬂed

t0 another state,

Where Ms. Homer reported

by 11:00 am. 0r noon

at

in court because

— p. 477,

L.

their location in the police

at the latest.

he was “minutes away”

and was only

475, L. 15

p.

(TL, p. 477, Ls. 7-15.)

about 1:00 p.m., Kropp never

he was arrested a year

later

on

charges in Washington, and was served With the bench warrant the court was forced t0 issue.
(TL, p. 477, L. 16

—

p.

478, L. 15.)

voluntary, particularly where “Mr.

484, L.

7; R., p.

At

the motion, ﬁnding that the absence

Kropp or Ms. Homer never came back.”

(Tr., p.

481, L. 2

was

— p.

281.)

sentencing,

acknowledged

The court denied

that

Kropp apologized

for “not

making

it”

0n

his

he “should have turned [himself] in a long time ago.”

The court sentenced him

to three

sentence to run concurrently.

judgment and sentence

last

(Tr., p.

court date and

492, Ls. 11-18.)

uniﬁed terms 0f ﬁfteen years with ﬁve years ﬁxed, each

(TL, p. 495, L. 18

(R., pp. 283-88),

—

p.

496, L.

6.)

and Kropp timely appealed

The

district court entered a

(R., pp.

298-301).

ISSUES
Kropp
1.

states the issues

Did

on appeal

the court abuse

as:

discretion in proceeding With the trial in Mr. Kropp’s

its

absence?
2.

Did

the court abuse

allow the defense

Can

3.

meet

the state

its

alibi

discretion in denying the

motion

to continue the trial t0

witness to appear and testify?

its

burden 0f proving those errors harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Kropp shown

that the district court

grant a continuance 0r mistrial because

committed reversible error where

Kropp was absent 0n

it

refused to

the second day 0f trial after

ﬂeeing?
2.

Has Kropp shown
continuance after
trial

committed reversible error by failing to grant a
Kropp’s
one 0f
Witnesses did not appear to testify on the second day 0f
that the district court

because she ﬂed with Kropp?

ARGUMENT
I.

Kropp Has Not Shown That He

T0
Proceeded Without Him After He Fled The

A.

Is

Entitled

A New Trial Because The District Court
State In

The Middle Of His

First Trial

Introduction

After appearing 0n the ﬁrst day of his two-day

trial,

Kropp

failed t0 appear

on the second,

suggesting in a text message to his counsel—sent at 8:52 a.m., eight minutes before

to

begin—that the vehicle he was travelling

d’Alene, where
indicated he

Though
that

trial

was

was being

eight miles

held.

he thereafter communicated
later

no dispute

12-15.)

trial,

that

1

in the

that

(T12, p.

did.1

365, L. 23

Nor

While renewing

p.

366, L. 9.)

there any indication

In fact, he did not return to court until

Washington 0n charges there and was returned

As Kropp’s

middle of his

Kropp’s absence 0n the second day 0f

district court

is

—

trial

t0

counsel acknowledged below, there

trial”

and ﬂed the
it”

state.

(Tr., p.

459, Ls.

0n the second day of

he “should have turned [himself] in a long time ago.” (TL,

trial in his

set

280, L. 15.) At around 1:00 p.m., he

he never

With his counsel.

arrested in

p.

Then, before sentencing, Kropp apologized for “not making

Completing his

and the

—

to court.

t0 arrive,

district court.

Kropp “did leave

acknowledging

11-18.)

at all

when he was

Idaho 0n a warrant issued by the
is

(TL, p. 276, L. 4

him time

was

was stuck roughly forty—ﬁve minutes from Coeur

away and “almost”

the court recessed to give

more than a year

in

trial

was obviously and concededly

p.

492, Ls.

voluntary.

absence was therefore not a Violation 0f any right he had t0 be present

did not err by continuing

trial in his

absence.

motion for a mistrial at this time, defense counsel also stated that he “will
accept the State’s ﬁndings and conclusions as stated earlier.” (TL, p. 367, Ls. 13-16.) It is
unclear What counsel was suggesting he would “accept” here. If he was accepting the court’s
conclusion that Kropp’s absence was voluntary, it was the ﬁrst 0f several such concessions.
his

Kropp apparently does not dispute
the district court abused

When

conclude that he was voluntarily absent

that

10-1

he was voluntarily absent,
That argument

as a result.

concluding that

trial

he was voluntarily absent. Instead, he argues that

discretion because the court

its

(m Appellant’s brief, pp.

that

it

1.)

That

came

fails.

is,

it

initially

he claims

that,

was

allegedly not in a position to

determined t0 proceed Without him.

though the

to the correct conclusion too quickly

The

somehow

Standard

B.

it

was not

initial inquiry;

even focusing

lacking; and, even if the district court’s initial analysis

was

any error was harmless.

for a continuance or mistrial is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 574, 569 P.2d 916, 919 (1977);

342, 127 P.3d 954, 958 (2005).

right to

and must be reversed

Of Review

A request
State V.

correct

should continue in his absence because Kropp was voluntarily absent should

initial inquiry,

lacking,

was

appellate inquiry Whether the district court erred in

not be myopically focused 0n the adequacy of the district court’s

only on that

district court

be present for

trial

But Where an appellant argues

by proceeding

issue, [this Court] conduct[s]

State V. Manley, 142 Idaho 338,

that a district court violated his

in his absence, “[b]ecause a constitutional right is at

an independent review on appeal based upon the

totality

of the

circumstances.” State V. Miller, 131 Idaho 186, 188, 953 P.2d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 1998).

C.

Did Not Commit Reversible Error BV Correctly Concluding That
Should Continue Because Kropp’s Absence Was Voluntary

The

District Court

“The

right

of an accused to be present

the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments and

the United States Constitution.”

Li.

at trial is

grounded in the Due Process Clauses 0f

the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

The same

right is conferred

10

Trial

by

Article

I,

Amendment

to

Section 13 of the

Idaho Constitution.

Li But “a defendant Who was

present at the outset of the

the trial.” Li. “‘It does not

accused person, being

seem

at large

t0 us t0

upon

be consonant With the dictates of common sense that an
should be

bail,

Whenever he pleased,

at liberty,

himself from the courts of his country and t0 break up a

V.

may waive the

be present thereafter by absconding or by otherwise voluntarily absenting himself during

right to

Diaz

trial

already

trial

t0

commenced.”

Withdraw

Li. (quoting

United States, 223 U.S. 442, 454 (1912)).
Idaho Criminal Rule 43, which

is

“Virtually identical to the corresponding federal rule,

essentially codiﬁes the constitutional principle enunciated in

the right t0 be present

by

[M],

may waive

that a defendant

voluntarily absenting himself during the trial.”

State V. Elliott, 126

Idaho 323, 325, 882 P.2d 978, 980 (Ct. App. 1994), overruling 0n other grounds recognized by
Idaho Dep’t of Health

201

&

Welfare

V.

Doe, 150 Idaho 752, 764, 250 P.3d 803, 815

That rule provides, in relevant

1).

part,

“A

other proceeding waives the right to be present

the

trial

.

defendant

.

.

When

Who was

(Ct.

App.

initially present at trial or

the defendant

is

voluntarily absent after

has begun, regardless of whether the court informed the defendant 0f an obligation to

remain during
proceeding

trial.”

may

I.C.R. 43(c)(1)(A).

“If the defendant waives the right t0

be present, the

continue t0 completion, including the verdict’s return and sentencing, during the

defendant’s absence.” I.C.R. 43(c)(2).

Where

a defendant argues 0n appeal that his right t0 be present at

because he was

initially present

presented

whether

Elliott,

.

.

.

is

126 Idaho

at

[he]

but

was

trial

was

was

violated

thereafter continued in his absence, “[t]he question

voluntarily absent and thereby

326, 882 P.2d at 981.

trial

ﬂ

waived

his right to

be present.”

also State V. Miller, 131 Idaho 186, 189, 953 P.2d

626, 629 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that district court did not err by failing to grant a continuance

where “the record here does not

establish that Miller’s absence

11

was involuntary”

after

he failed to

was unsure When he was supposed

appear, initially reported that he

to

be in court, and

later

reported car troubles).

Though he appeared 0n
second day, ﬂed the
issued

by the court

absconded during

and ﬁnishing the
at

982 (holding

m,

414 U.S.

state,

trial in

and was only returned

He was

trial,

trial

the

on a warrant

later

then admitted what was obvious—that he

therefore voluntarily absent, he

who ﬂed from

Kropp never appeared 0n

more than a year

his absence did not Violate that right.

that defendant

17,

t0 Idaho

He

he ﬂed to Washington.

after

trial.

the ﬁrst day 0f his two-day

was

waived

m,

his right t0

126 Idaho

at

be present,

327, 882 P.2d

voluntarily absent); Taylor V. United

20 (1973) (same).

Understandably, Kropp does not really dispute the conclusion that he was voluntarily

There

absent.

day 0f

trial,

is

no basis

failed to

to

do so

in light

fact that

he failed to appear

ﬁthher communicate With his counsel

there mid-day, did not reappear for

state, his

0f the

after stating that

more than a year and only

counsel explicitly acknowledged that he

left in

at all

after

0n the second

he was “almost”

being re-arrested in another

the middle of his trial (Tr., p. 459, Ls.

12-15), and then he did so prior to sentencing (TL, p. 492, Ls. 11-18). Instead, he asks this Court

t0 focus

0n a

Kropp was

different question entirely:

Whether the

voluntarily absent based only

district court

was

on the evidence available

determined t0 proceed in his absence, setting aside the fact that
voluntarily absent

that

Kropp was

entitled to conclude that

was subsequently conﬁrmed and

its

to

it

when

judgment

it

initially

that

he was

setting aside the court’s repeated afﬁrmations

voluntarily absent in light 0f subsequent events. But that question has

with whether Kropp was voluntarily absent—even assuming, arguendo, that the
not initially justiﬁed in concluding that Kropp

was

12

voluntarily absent, he

was

little

to

district court

do

was

voluntarily absent,

the district court continued to inquire into the circumstances 0f his absence, subsequent events

conﬁrmed

that

he was voluntarily absent, and the

In support of refocusing the inquiry,

11.) In

m,

district court

Kropp

relies

0n

recognized as much.

m.

(Apppellant’s brief, pp. 8-

the Idaho Court 0f Appeals held that, in determining that a defendant

is

voluntarily

absent,

the

trial

court need only: (1)

make

sufﬁcient inquiry into the circumstances 0f a

defendant’s disappearance to justify a ﬁnding whether the absence
(2)

make

a preliminary ﬁnding of voluntariness,

was

voluntary,

When justiﬁed, and (3) afford the
When the defendant is

defendant an adequate opportunity to explain the absence
returned to custody and before sentence

m,

126 Idaho

at

328, 882 P.2d at 983.

is

The

imposed.

district court

here did each 0f those things. The

court initially delayed the beginning 0f the second day 0f trial for over an hour to investigate the

circumstances of Kropp’s absence.

standards.

285, L. 2

(Tr., p.

—

p.

It

recognized

its

discretion and cited the applicable legal

290, L. 21.) Over the course of the day, including by means of

Kropp’s communications with his attorney,

it

to appear, particularly after falsely claiming

he was “Almost there” and then apparently providing

became completely

no indication where he was and Why he was not
that

at court.

The

clear that

district

Kropp was not going

repeatedly

made ﬁndings

Kropp’s absence was voluntary and repeatedly denied defense counsel’s renewed motions

new

for a mistrial or a

11; p. 481, L. 2

—

p.

trial.

(TL, p. 297, L. 13

484, L.

7; R., p.

281.)

—

p.

298, L. 15; p. 367, Ls. 17-21; p. 434, Ls. 2-

And—more

than a year

later,

when Kropp was

returned from Washington 0n an Idaho warrant—the court gave Kropp an opportunity t0 explain

his absence before

in the

middle 0f

it

pronounced sentence, with Kropp’s attorney acknowledging

trial

himself in earlier (TL,

that

Kropp

left

(TL, p. 459, Ls. 12-15) and with Kropp apologizing for failing t0 turn

p.

district court’s correct

492, Ls. 11-18). Nothing in Elliott suggests that appellate review 0f a

conclusion that a defendant’s absence was voluntary and

13

trial

should

addressed only to the sufﬁciency of the evidence on the

therefore continue in his absence

is

district court’s initial consideration

of the question.

But, even focusing only

that

on Whether the

district court

was

initially justiﬁed in

concluding

Kropp’s absence was voluntary, that preliminary conclusion was justiﬁed then. In discussing

the evidence before the district court before resuming

to his attorney regarding his absence

when he

stated that his vehicle

was described

was

trial,

at 8:52 a.m., eight

as the Conklin Flats.”

When he was

it

was “disingenuous”

(TL, p. 278, L. 25

t0 suggest that

trial

was

—

note that his ﬁrst report

minute before

p.

trial

was

to begin,

trial

failure t0

—

in

what

That puts Kropp

280, L. 15.)

(TL, p. 476, L. 9

Kropp’s

forty—ﬁve minutes from the city in which

attorney eight minutes before

fails to

was stuck “somewhere between Chatcolet and Plummer

approximately forty—ﬁve minutes from Coeur d’Alene.
the state noted,

Kropp

p.

477, L. 12.2)

As

appear was involuntary

was being held and he contacted

his

(TL, p. 282, Ls. 1-12.) The district court could

to begin.

reasonably conclude—at least as a preliminary matter subject t0 further evidence, Which
preliminary judgment was ultimately conﬁrmed—that Kropp was voluntarily absent.

Finally, if the district court erred, the error

State V. Clark, 132 Idaho 337, 340, 971 P.2d 1161,

was harmless beyond a reasonable
1164

(Ct.

Will be regarded as harmless if the appellate court determines

same

result

would have been reached, regardless 0f the

error—holding
matter.

trial in

his

absence—is

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.)

structural error

As an

App. 1998) (“Genera11y, an error

beyond a reasonable doubt

error.”).

and s0

initial matter,

doubt.

is

Kropp argues

that the

that the alleged

considered harmful as a per se

Kropp has not

cited a single case

2

According t0 Google Maps, half—way between Chatcolet and Plummer 0n Idaho Highway 5
would put Kropp approximately forty minutes from Coeur d’Alene.
Google Maps,
https://goo. gl/maps/ch9VLZ4kWA 1 0ftnu9.

E
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holding that the Violation of a defendant’s right to be present

at trial is structural error

including the United States Supreme Court, have held otherwise.

422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975) (noting
harmless error”); Polizzi

V.

that “a Violation

United

exclusion 0f a defendant from a

States,

0f Rule 43

was

More

‘critical’

violated.

importantly, and again,

He

may

550 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th
portion of the

reversal, if in the particular case the defendant’s absence

doubt”).

Kropp

is

trial

by concluding too
trial.

harmless. See,

V.

United States,

some circumstances be

in

1976) (“even improper

Cir.

was harmless beyond a reasonable

not arguing that his right to be present at

e.g.,

quickly, even though

That alleged error

United States

even “assuming the

V.

district court

is

trial.

it

trial,

and so cannot argue

concluded correctly, that he was voluntarily

certainly not structural and, in fact, is undoubtedly

Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 280 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that,

should have

made

a more thorough inquiry t0 determine

.

.

.

[because] Wallingford

concedes he was a fugitive and thus cannot prove he was involuntarily absent

convened the morning of June
94

(Ct.

acted t0

6”);

that

Instead, his claim is that the district court

Whether Wallingford was voluntarily absent, any error was harmless

88,

trial

does not dispute that he voluntarily absconded in the middle of trial, does not

the district court violated his right to be present at

absent from

Rogers

courts,

does not automatically require

dispute that he thereby voluntarily waived his right to be present at

erred

E

and

People

V.

When

court

Vargas, 53 Cal. App. 3d 516, 524, 126 Cal. Rptr.

App. 1975) (“While the question of the sufﬁciency of the showing 0n Which the court

ﬁnd

that the defendant’s absence

was voluntary has a

certain

academic

interest,

it is

obvious 0n the entire record that any error in the court’s action 0n July 15, 1971, was not the
cause 0f any prejudice to defendant, because the whole record reﬂects that any procrastination or
delay in proceeding would have been unavailing, and that in fact the defendant’s absence was not

only voluntary but prolonged”).

Had

the district court delayed the beginning of the second day

15

of trial

until that afternoon or

even the next day, when

going t0 show and was not stuck in a ditch,

would be

he

in exactly the position that

correct conclusion too quickly, that error

The

district court investigated the

the absence

absence

even

was

voluntary,

When he was back

if the district court

that error is harmless

was

is

in

trial

it

was

would have continued

now.

Kropp was not

in his absence

If the district court erred

and he

by coming

t0 the

was undoubtedly harmless.
circumstances of Kropp’s absence, repeatedly held that

correct in so holding, gave

in custody,

perfectly clear that

and so did not

err

Kropp an opportunity

by ﬁnishing

the

trial in his

did err by correctly concluding too early that he

was

to explain his

absence. But

voluntarily absent,

beyond a reasonable doubt.

II.

Kropp Has Not Shown That He Is Entitled To A New Trial Because The District Court Refused
T0 Grant A Continuance When His Defense Witness Assisted Him In Absconding
A.

Introduction

Kropp argues next
alleged alibi Witness, Ms.

is

that the district court erred

Homer, was not present

by refusing

t0 continue trial

because his

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-14.)

to testify.

He

mistaken.

On

the

morning 0f the second day of trial, When Kropp was not present, defense counsel

speculated that the vehicle in which he

Homer’s. (TL,

p.

278, L. 25

— p. 280,

Who’s under subpoena,

believe that creates certain rights for

15-23.)

travelling

L. 15.) Later, but

that the court should declare a mistrial

his “Witness,

was

and
still

that

was

before

trial

allegedly stuck

was Ms.

began and while arguing

because of Kropp’s absence, defense counsel claimed that

is

also unable to

make

it.

I

would have

to

my client to be able t0 present his defense.”

Defense counsel did not thereafter raise Ms. Homer’s absence again

16

brush up, but
(Tr., p.

I

292, Ls.

at trial and, in

move

particular, did not

the defense

began

for a continuance or mistrial

when Ms. Homer was

that

Kropp’s comment regarding Ms.

Homer

presenting

still

its

evidence,

when

and so then there was n0 reason for the court

make

did not thereafter

its

case and she

was

there

was no reason

not present.

Even

for

t0 grant a continuance

0r renew any request for a continuance

still

that

if

he had done

Ms. Homer

due

when the
so, there

evidence suggested that he and Ms.

Standard

“A
the

trial

Homer were together avoiding

be

at trial,

t0 her absence.

Kropp

state

t0

ﬁnished presenting

would be no

basis for a

In fact, the

attendance.

Of Review

decision t0 grant or deny a motion for continuance

court.” State V.

When

trial

motion was made While

continuance because Kropp was not diligent in securing Ms. Homer’s attendance.

B.

when

before the second day 0f

began constituted a motion for a continuance based 0n her absence,

was

not present

to present its case.

Assuming

the state

still

is

vested in the sound discretion of

Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 574, 569 P.2d 916, 919 (1977).

Court reviews an alleged abuse 0f discretion by a trial court the
sequence 0f inquiry requires consideration 0f four essentials. Whether the trial
this

court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as

outer boundaries of

its

one of discretion;

(2) acted within the

discretion; (3) acted consistently With the legal standards

applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available to

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by

the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg

C.

V.

My Fun Life,

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

Kropp Has Not Shown That The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV Denying
Motion For A Continuance Due T0 Ms. Homer’s Absence From Trial

A defendant 0n motion for a continuance, moving 0n the ground 0f absent
witnesses,

is

required to give the

names of

his

proposed witnesses, show what

facts he intends to prove by them, that the Witness is not absent by his
procurement 0r consent, that the Witness’ testimony is material to his defense, that

he has used diligence in attempting to procure his attendance

17

at the trial,

and has

A

failed t0

d0 so and

procure his attendance at a later term if the continuance

State V.

V.

he can and will

that there is a reasonable probability that
is

had.

Waggoner, 124 Idaho 716, 722-23, 864 P.2d 162, 168-69

McClurg, 50 Idaho 762, 779, 300

P. 898,

(Ct.

App. 1993) (quoting State

904 (1931)). Kropp did not attempt

to

make any of

these showings to the district court. Before the second day of trial even began, While arguing that

a mistrial

to

was necessary because Kropp was not

Ms. Homer, suggesting

would have

t0

that his “witness,

brush up, but

I

present, defense counsel

who’s under subpoena,

believe that creates certain rights for

his defense.” (TL, p. 292, Ls. 15-23.)

Assuming

the district court’s denial of the request

evidence.

trial

(R., p. 162.)

The

state did

2:30 p.m., four and a halfhours
reason for Ms.
witnesses

Homer

who were

to

be present

state

discretion.

its

still

in the

at

— p.

10:00 a.m., before the

middle of presenting

its

its

evidence until about

399, L. 12.) There

was n0

Because the court had issued an order excluding

Defense counsel represented that Kropp and Ms. Homer were making an

and were waiting for a tow

truck.

And,

at

Homer

approximately 1:15 p.m.,

t0

be present

at trial,

still

more

defense counsel

from Kropp indicated they were “‘Almost there’” and “‘Eight miles from Coeur

d’Alene.’” (TL, p. 365, L. 23
there

was

(R., p. 168; Tr., p. 397, L. 9

than an hour before there was any reason for Ms.
stated that texts

I

my client t0 be able to present

not complete the presentation of

until then.

it.

not then testifying, she could not even have been present in the courtroom.

(T12, p. 128, Ls. 8—19.)

effort to arrive

later.

make

that that constituted a request for a continuance,

was well within

even began and While the

a vague reference

also unable to

is

Defense counsel’s reference to Ms. Homer’s absence was made
second day 0f

made

was no reason

for

by the time she needed

—

p.

366, L. 18.) There

Ms. Homer

to

was n0 reason

to grant a continuance

When

be present and n0 reason t0 think she would not be present

to testify.

18

After Kropp sent text messages indicating they were almost there, the court waited t0

resume

trial

motion for a

and,

when Kropp and Ms. Homer

mistrial.

(Tr., p.

366, L. 4

—

p.

The court denied

(TL, p. 367, Ls. 13-16.)

still

did not arrive, defense counsel renewed his

368, L.

8.)

He

did not mention Ms.

that motion, again

ﬁnding

that

Homer

at all.

Kropp’s absence was

voluntary, and the court did not “see any other legal basis for a mistrial at this point.”

(Tr., p.

367, Ls. 17-21.) Defense counsel did not interject and argue that, even if Kropp’s absence

voluntary, a continuance 0r mistrial

defense counsel

move

was

was necessary because 0f Ms. Homer’s absence. Nor did

for a continuance 0r mistrial

more than an hour

later

when

the state

ﬁnished the presentation of its evidence and there was, for the ﬁrst time, actually reason for Ms.

Homer

to

be present. Instead, the only discussion 0f Kropp’s 0r Ms. Homer’s absence involved

defense counsel asking the district court not to alter the previous instruction the court gave the
jury regarding Kropp’s absence. (TL, p. 395, Ls. 2-21.3) The state rested, defense counsel called

n0 Witnesses, and there was n0 mention 0f Ms. Homer.
defense counsel intended t0

that

was

the time to do so,

move

when

it

(TL, p. 397, L. 9

for a continuance 0r mistrial based

was

clear

—

p.

when

she

was needed

Ms. Homer was not present When she needed

that day, the extent to

If

on Ms. Homer’s absence,

and defense counsel could make a showing regarding the diligence 0f Kropp’s
her attendance

399, L. 12.)

to

be

efforts to secure

which Kropp consented

t0 or

was

complicit in her failure t0 attend, the probability 0f securing Ms. Homer’s attendance in the

future,

and the materiality 0f her testimony

in light

of the

state’s case.

When

there might have

been reason to make a motion for a continuance, Kropp did not make one. Instead, he raised Ms.

3

In a footnote in his opening brief,

instruction.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5 n. 2.)

instruction as an issue

modify the

Kropp appears

on appeal and,

to express

some

dissatisfaction with the

But he has not addressed the adequacy 0f the
below not t0

as just noted, he explicitly asked the court

instruction.
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Homer’s absence only When

there

was n0 reason

for her t0

be

there,

n0 reason

for the court t0

grant a continuance, and without addressing any of the factors required t0 establish the propriety

0f a continuance. The

Even

if

district court

Kropp had

raised

properly denied any such motion.

Ms. Homer’s absence When the

state

completed

its

presentation

0f evidence, the motion would have been properly denied because Kropp did not act diligently to
secure Ms. Homer’s attendance at

trial

counsel represented that Kropp and Ms.

p.

and was

in fact complicit in her absence.4

Homer were

travelling together.

Defense

(TL, p. 280, Ls. 9-15;

292, Ls. 15-25.) After Kropp suggested they were “almost there,” neither he nor Ms.

ever appeared, going somewhere other than the court.

Even

after trial, there

Homer

was never any

attempt by Kropp 0r counsel below t0 dispel the obvious impression that the two simply
together mid-trial

Where

(TL, p. 459, Ls. 12-15), with Ms.

Homer

thereby failing t0 appear t0

left

testify.

the defendant procures 0r consents t0 a witness’s absence, he cannot complain that the

district court

refused to grant a continuance t0 secure the witness’s attendance.

124 Idaho

722-23, 864 P.2d

at

265 (1973) (holding
show, inter

that

alia, that

at

m

Waggoner,

168-69; State V. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 448, 511 P.2d 263,

an applicant for a continuance based on the absence of a Witness should

he has exercised “reasonable diligence

.

.

.

to obtain the presence

0f the

witness” and should provide “sufﬁcient reason for the absence of the witness”). Finally, neither
did Kropp provide any indication “that there

would procure

the attendance” of Ms.

Homer

was a reasonable

if a

probability that he could and

continuance was granted.

State V. Lopez, 107

Idaho 826, 827, 693 P.2d 472, 473 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a motion for a continuance was
properly denied where there was n0 such showing).

4

A11 appearances at

trial

and thereafter

For the same reason, any motion for a continuance made before the beginning of the second day
0f trial was properly denied.
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indicated that Ms.

Homer

assisted

Kropp

Kropp himself did not appear

in absconding.

for

more

There was no reason t0 believe Ms. Homer’s

than a year and was arrested as a fugitive.

attendance would have been easier to secure after she assisted Kropp in absconding and

apparently disregarded a subpoena.

Finally, the only case cited

by Kropp

for the proposition that this Court should reverse

due to Ms. Homer’s absence, Schwartzmiller
1985), does not support him.

108 Idaho 329, 699 P.2d 429

(Ct.

App.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-15.) Schwartzmiller involved a petition

compulsory process and due process

for post-conviction relief alleging a denial of

was alleged

V. State,

that a defense Witness

failed t0

appear “because of threats

rights

where

made by

it

federal

authorities against [the Witness], thus depriving Schwartzmiller 0f his constitutional right 0f

compulsory process.”
rather than cases like

Li. at 330,

699 P.2d

Waggoner, addressed

at

430.

Kropp presumably

t0 the denial

relies

on Schartzmiller

of a motion for a continuance, because

he did not make a motion for continuance addressed t0 Ms. Homer’s absence. In Schartzmiller,
the Court 0f Appeals held that allegations of a denial 0f compulsory process associated with

“unavailable Witnesses” should be evaluated

including:

by focusing on

“three relevant factual inquiries,”

“the nature and extent 0f government conduct, if any, that contributed t0 the

unavailability 0f the witness, the importance of the evidence t0 the defendant’s case, and the

defendant’s diligence in exercising his sixth

amendment

right.” Li. at 330-31,

699 P.2d

at

430-

31.

As an

initial matter,

Kropp did not argue below

that

he was being denied compulsory

process rights or due process rights, and he has not argued 0n appeal that the ﬁmdamental error

analysis suggests reversal

is

appropriate.

As

discussed above, the only reference to Ms. Homer’s

absence was an extremely short, vague reference to the effect that her absence “creates certain

21

rights for

my

before Ms.

client to

be able

(TL, p. 292, Ls. 15-23), Which

to present his defense”

Homer even needed

t0

be

at trial to testify.

That single, vague reference to “certain

rights”—made only When due process and compulsory process

Kropp was not even presenting

issue because

argument

that

his

rights could not

E

have been

at

defense—does not preserve the speciﬁc

Kropp was denied due process 0r compulsory process

failed t0 appear.

was made

rights

when Ms. Kropp

347 P.3d 1025, 1029

State V. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 368,

(Ct.

later

App.

2015) (constitutional arguments not raised before lower courts are not preserved for appellate
review).

The exception

to the general rule that issues not raised

below cannot be addressed on

appeal involves allegations of fundamental error. State V. Medina, 165 Idaho 501, 505, 447 P.3d

949,

953 (2019) (“Alleged constitutional errors during

trial

not followed by a

are

that

contemporaneous obj ection must be reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine.” (quotation

marks omitted». But an assertion

Where a party

fails t0 allege

that there

fundamental

was fundamental

error, address the

error

below

is

waived on appeal

relevant authority, and present a cogent argument regarding fundamental error.

m1,

m

fundamental error standard,

135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001); State

V.

E

cite

Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,

263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“A party waives an issue cited 0n appeal if either authority or

argument

is

lacking, not just if both are lacking”).

But even

if the

compulsory process
review, the argument

Court considers Kropp’s

rights

were

new

allegation that his

violated, either as a preserved issue 0r

due process or

on fundamental

error

fails.

Applying the standard articulated in Schartzmiller, there

is

misconduct by the government and, as discussed above, Kropp was

Ms. Homer’s attendance. In

fact,

he was complicit in her
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n0 evidence or allegation of
far

failure t0

from

diligent in securing

appear to

testify,

and then

never

made an

Only the

appropriate and properly supported motion for a continuance due t0 her absence.

third factor, the importance

that factor does not.

In evaluating the “importance” of

would ever have offered

E

State V.

of her testimony, might weigh in favor of Kropp, but even

any, the court

Dalmple, 144

Ms. Homer’s testimony, assuming she

must consider Whether the testimony would be

material.

Idaho 628, 635, 167 P.3d 765, 772 (2007) (holding that compulsory

process rights were not violated Where the district court precluded testimony 0n “hypnosis”

defense because, “[i]n light 0f the entire record,” the defense was so implausible as to be not
material). “In constitutional terms, evidence is material if

the

minds of the jurors

it

would

create a reasonable doubt in

State V. Garza, 109 Idaho 40, 43,

that did not otherwise exist.”

944, 947 (Ct. App. 1985). “Materiality goes t0 the weight of the evidence.”

The evidence introduced conclusively shows
the notice alibi Witness suggests he was.

that

According

704 P.2d

Li

Kropp was not with Ms. Homer when

t0 the notice

of

alibi Witness,

Ms. Homer

claimed t0 be With Kropp from before noon on February 23rd until she dropped him off in Liberty
Lake, Washington, around midnight on the evening of February

camera footage showed Kropp stealing a Subaru from a school
23rd,

p.

While he was supposedly With Ms. Homer. (TL,

p.

25th.

at

206, L. 14

(R., p. 104.)

But security

around 2:00 p.m. 0n February

—

p.

208, L. 14; p. 314, L.

1

—

320, L. 7; EXS., pp. 43, 47; EX. 18 (surveillance Video).) Ms. Rutter, Kropp’s girlfriend, then

testiﬁed that

Kropp showed up

in the afternoon

of February 23rd with a Subaru she had not seen

before and, between the evening 0f February 23rd and February 25th, he

repeatedly burglarized the storage

163, L. 19

—

p.

215, L. 22.)

Two

facility,

was With her and

using the Subaru to transport stolen items.

Witnesses

Who were

at the storage facility

(TL, p.

0n the evening of

February 25th or early morning 0f February 26th testiﬁed that they observed three people
storage facility in

Coeur d’Alene, thought them suspicious and, when they

23

left in

at the

a Subaru,

followed them into Washington, notiﬁed police, and eventually

left

only

When

the Subaru

appeared to be stuck in the snow in a residential area in Washington and they saw police
(T12, p.

242, L. 11

that, prior t0

0n February

was

—

p.

— p.

249, L. 20; p. 299, L. 11

following them out 0f the
25th (TL, p. 303, L. 13

allegedly dropping

Kropp off

—

in

One 0fthose

Witnesses testiﬁed

she saw the three at the facility before midnight

facility,

304, L.

p.

310, L. 25.)

lights.

7),

which was about the same time Ms. Homer

Washington. Kropp and Ms. Rutter were then arrested

around 1:30 am. on February 26th When a canine unit was dispatched to ﬁnd the passengers

had

“bail[ed] out” 0f a stolen vehicle, the Subaru,

in a residential area near the Subaru.

photographs of footprints in the snow

wearing that evening.

(Tr., p.

—

They introduced photographs 0f

79-89.)

appeared to match the

tires

p.

— p.

p.

348, L.

a

335, L. 9.)

p.

whole,

353, L. 20

snow

the

1

— p.

(ﬂ, gg,

T11, p.

— p. 387,

—

p.

Homer.

was

was with him

—

376,

p.

t0 contain items stolen

from

326, Ls. 11-19; p. 334, L. 19

— p.

L. 21.)

When he was

already

Witnesses with no interest in the proceedings saw him in Coeur

arrested hiding

that

354, L. 13; Exs., pp.

351, L. 5; p. 375, L. 13

Homer in Washington,

from police shortly

thereafter.

Rutter’s footprints, and the Subaru’s tire tracks were at the storage facility.

that she

introduced

Ms. Homer’s testimony was so implausible and

d’Alene when he was allegedly being dropped off by Ms.
the Subaru, and he

state

at the storage facility that

unpersuasive as t0 be not material. Kropp was 0n Video stealing a Subaru
allegedly With Ms.

The

matching the shoes Kropp was

The Subaru was found

372, L. 11; p. 373, L. 3

as

8; p.

tire tracks in

the storage units, a bolt cutter, and cut locks.

Given the record

341, L.

ofthe Subaru. (TL,

L. 11; p. 383, Ls. 7-10; Exs., pp. 91-109.)

335, L. 17; p. 369, L. 14

—

at the storage facility

340, L. 22

Who

and Kropp and Ms. Rutter were found hiding

325, L. 20

(T12, p.

at

weekend,

that they repeatedly
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followed him in

His footprints, Ms.

Ms. Rutter testiﬁed

used the Subaru t0 burglarize the

storage facility, and the Subaru

testimony.

from

He was

was then found

clearly not with

Ms. Homer when the notice suggests he was.

his “cousin—in-law” t0 the contrary

factors suggest a denial

to contain stolen items consistent

would not be

None of the

material.

of any due process 0r compulsory process

T0 show fundamental
(1) the

Testimony

three Schartzmiller

right.

For similar reasons, Kropp could not show fundamental error even
appeal.

with her

if

he had raised

it

on

error,

defendant must demonstrate that one 0r more of the defendant’s unwaived

constitutional rights

were violated;

(2) the error

must be

clear or obvious, Without

the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,

including information as to Whether the failure to object

and

was a

tactical decision;

must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant’s
meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the

(3) the defendant

substantial rights,

outcome of the

trial

proceedings.

State V. Alwin, 164 Idaho 160, 165,

426 P.3d 1260, 1265 (2018).

For the reasons discussed

above, there was n0 constitutional right was violated.

Even
substantial

if there

was some

rights.

In

fact,

pretrial—directly contradicted

the

the

testimony

outcome of the proceedings.

guilt).

Ms.

Homer

at

she

would provide

trial—would not have affected

State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 273,

was harmless where

that the error affected his

suggested

by exceptionally strong evidence

(error in admitting inadmissible evidence

0f

Kropp has not shown

right violated,

there

429 P.3d 149, 161 (2018)

was overwhelming evidence

For that reason, Kropp cannot establish fundamental error because his compulsory

process 0r due process rights were violated and, if this Court determines that the district court

failed to grant a

Finally,

rights

was

motion for a continuance,
Kropp’s

failure to assert

that error

was harmless.

any Violation of his compulsory process 0r due process

perfectly reasonable, and likely tactical, in light 0f the fact that the notice 0f alibi

witness suggested Ms.

Homer was going

t0 give

25

wholly implausible testimony in

light

of the

evidence already presented and Where Kropp himself had consented to or procured Ms. Homer’s
absence.

Kropp has not shown
motion for a continuance or
clearly

moved

either that the district court

that

t0 secure one;

its

discretion

by denying a

he was denied any right to compulsory process.

for a continuance based

showing required

abused

on Ms. Homer’s absence; he did not attempt

He

to

he was not diligent in securing her attendance and in

complicit in her absence; and her purported alibi testimony

was not

never

make

the

fact

was

material.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm Kropp’s judgment 0f conviction.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2020.
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Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY

copy 0f the foregoing
of iCourt File and Serve:
correct

that

I

have

3rd day 0f November, 2020, served a true and

this

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY

to the attorney listed

& BARTLETT LLP

db@nbmlaw.com

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General

AVW/dd

26

below by means

